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REVIEW 
 
Philippe Artières, Jean-François Bert, Philippe Chevallier, Pascal Michon, Mathieu 
Potte-Bonneville, Judith Revel and Jean-Claude Zancarini (textes choisis et présentés 
par), Les mots et les choses de Foucault. Regards critiques 1966-1968 (Caen: Presses Uni-
versitaires de Caen, 2009), ISBN: 978-2841333479 
It might be considered very anti-foucauldian, at first sight, to write the commentary of this 
collection of commentaries of Les mots et les choses (1966) compiled and edited by some of the 
present day best known Foucault scholars in France.  This volume actually presents a set of 
reactions brought about by Foucault’s ‚archéologie des sciences humaines,‛ between 1966 and 
1968, authored by some of the most prominent French intellectuals―philosophers, historians, 
sociologists―and originally published in the most meaningful philosophical and political 
journals of the time in France: Raymond Bellour (Les Lettres françaises), François Châtelet (La 
Quinzaine littéraire), Madeleine Chapsal (L’Express), Gilles Deleuze (Le Nouvel Observateur), 
Jean-Paul Sartre (L’Arc), Michel Amiot (Les Temps modernes), Olivier Revault d’Allonnes (Rai-
son présente), Michel de Certeau (Études), Jean d’Ormesson (La Nouvelle Revue française), Pierre 
Burgelin (Esprit), Georges Canguilhem (Critique), Roger Garaudy (La Pensée), Jean-Claude 
Margolin (Revue des sciences humaines), Bernard Balan (La Pensée). 
Among this number of articles, only Michel de Certeau’s ‚Les sciences humaines et la 
mort de l’homme,‛ (173-197) and Georges Canguilhem’s ‚Mort de l’homme ou épuisement du 
Cogito?,‛ (247-274) have been published in English prior to the here reviewed work.1  As a 
result, the papers included in this collection, as well as the journals in which they were first 
published, have remained better known to the French public than to the Anglophone one.  As 
the editors point out in their excellent general Introduction (7-35) and in the brief presen-
tations that precede each paper, all these contributions, taken together in their specific context 
of self and hetero reference, provocation and response, bring back not only the reception of 
Foucault’s work at the time of its publication, the resistances it aroused as well as the further 
developments that it originated, but also the intellectual and philosophical context that made 
all of it possible in France in the first half of the 1960s.  This collection of ‚regards critiques‛ is 
much more than a collection of commentaries on Les mots et les choses, since, by means of its 
different receptions and its original openings, these ‚regards critiques‛ provide the opportunity 
of reassessing one of the most meaningful phases of the history of the French philosophical 
                                                          
1 Michel de Certeau, ‚The Black Sun of Language: Foucault,‛ in Brian Massumi (trans.), Heterologies: Dis-
course on the Other (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 171-184; and George Canguilhem, 
‚The Death of Man, or Exhaustion of the Cogito?‛ in Gary Gutting (ed.) & Catherine Porter (trans.), The Cam-
bridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 74-94. 
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scene, one that was concerned mostly, at that time, with the debates between and within the va-
rious forms of Phenomenology, Marxism, Existentialism, and Structuralism.   
Just by lingering on the journals in which the contributions of this volume were pub-
lished―from an explicit communist commitment (Les Lettres françaises; La Pensée.  Revue du 
rationalisme moderne) to a Christian obedience (Études), from a wider intellectual interest in the 
literary and political current news (Le Nouvel Observateur; L’Express), to academic news in the 
field of humanities (Revue des Sciences humaines)―one can form a clear overview of the dif-
ferent political and philosophical alignments that received Foucault’s archaeology in the 1960s.  
In general, the attitudes expressed in the pages of these journals are a critical illustrative ac-
count of the progressive changeover, in the French philosophical context, from the intellectual 
hegemony of the existentialistic humanism to the supremacy of structuralism (cf. Chapsal, ‚La 
plus grande révolution depuis l’existentalisme.‛) (57-71)  And actually, except for the contri-
butions of Deleuze, Canguilhem and De Certeau which problematize Foucault’s use of the 
concept of ‚structure‛ from an epistemological and methodological point of view, almost all 
the reviewers included in the volume agree in considering Foucault as one of the most repre-
sentative example of the structuralist vague hanging over the French intellectuals during the 
1960s (in particular Sartre, ‚Jean-Paul Sartre répond,‛ (75-89) and Garaudi, ‚Structuralisme et 
‘mort de l’homme’.‛)  (277-299) 
The main resistances that the opponents to structuralism put forward, in relation to 
Foucault’s archaeology of the episteme, concern the meaning of history and the role that man 
plays in it.  Sartre’s contribution is clearly the most meaningful in this respect.  What Sartre 
cannot accept in Foucault’s archaeology is the refusal of a dialectical conception of history that 
inevitably ends up by disclaiming subjectivity as the driving force of praxis (on this point, see 
also Margolin, ‚L’homme de Michel Foucault.‛) (333, 339)  Like many other criticisms to Fou-
cault’s archaeological perspective presented in this volume, this position has a strong political 
connotation.  And actually the most part of those authors that, like Sartre, accuse Foucault of 
wrongly replacing the movement of history with the immobility of the structures, claim 
Marx’s capability of ‚taking both ends of the chain: the structure, that is the structuring by the 
past, as well as the creative activity of man generating structures‛ (Garaudi, (286) Cf. also Re-
vault d’Allonnes, ‚Michel Foucault: Les mots et les choses.‛)  (160) 
Today the diatribe between existentialism and structuralism, as well as its political im-
plications, are no more topical.  What’s more, we can appraise Les mots et les choses in light of 
the full development of Foucault’s thought.  To give credence to Foucault’s retrospective re-
marks, we could go so far as to recognize even in archaeology the space of possibility for the 
subject, outlined by the philosopher in his last works and lectures.  The amazement, the dis-
may, the uncertainty before the archaeological subversion of the traditional methods and cate-
gories of philosophy have given way, among the interpreters, to a more academic search for 
philosophical influences and lineages.  Yet, the debate is still heated about Foucault’s episte-
mological style, and the methodological problem of how writing the history of knowledges is 
still topical.  In this respect, one is reminded of the questions about the ‚kind of knowledge‛ 
(Amiot), (119) or the ‚epistemological space‛ of the archaeological discourse (Revault d’Al-
lonnes) (167) as regards the sciences that it analyzes.  This is a problem that has haunted not 
only the first interpreters of Foucault’s archaeology―some of which have concluded on its 
‚relativism‛ (Revault d’Allonnes) or ‚culturalist relativism‛ (Amiot)―but also a few of the 
most influential present day Foucault scholars.  We can consider, for instance, the case of Jür-
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gen Habermas, who reproved archaeology for presenting ‚the methodological paradox of a 
science that writes the history of the human sciences with the goal of a radical critique of 
reason.‛2 Worth mentioning is also Béatrice Han’s Foucault’s Critical Project3), where it is clai-
med that genealogy, in Foucault’s thought, is circumscribed to nothing but the function of res-
cuing archaeology from the relativism it had run into. 
This debate is far from being closed in these last years, taking into consideration that 
the paradoxical immanence of archaeology praised by Deleuze in his review of 1966, (70) of 
this ‚method―according to De Certeau―that is the signifier of a signified which is impossible 
to enunciate,‛ (176) is the core of the current studies into the oxymoric concept of historical a 
priori.  Just think, in this respect, of Johanna Oksala’s Foucault on Freedom,4 or Giorgio Agam-
ben’s Signatura rerum5; both these works investigate Foucault’s concept of episteme precisely by 
questioning the paradoxical relation that it establishes between historicity and transcenden-
tality. 
These questions remain relevant today, not only for Foucault scholars that exert 
themselves to dispel one of the main misunderstandings of Foucault’s thought―the one which 
reads archaeology as a sterile and a-historical description of the existing field of different form 
of knowledge in a specific period (cf. Sartre’s image of archaeology as ‚magic lantern,‚ (76) 
and Balan, ‚Entretiens sur Foucault. Deuxième entretien,‛ (345-367)) but also for those philo-
sophers that endeavor to rethink Foucault’s methodology in light of the topical debate about 
the history of sciences.  It is a debate that does not focus especially on Foucault, but that comes 
to him via the established relation between history and the philosophy of sciences, where the 
concepts of ‚episteme‛ and ‚structure‛ appear crucial, in so far as they concern the problem of 
thinking together historicity and the explanatory categories that account for it. 
Canguilhem’s paper included in the present volume is the most relevant in this respect, 
since the way it approaches archaeology by referring to such French epistemologists as Ba-
chelard and Cavaillès is nowadays at the heart of the studies on the role played by ‚the French 
network‛ in the outlining of the ‚historical epistemology.‛6 
Canguilhem’s remark, namely that ‚it is a paradox that the episteme is not an object for 
epistemology,‛ but it ‚is that for which a discursive status is sought‛ (262) is particularly deter-
minant for those current epistemological projects that aim at writing the history of sciences 
driven by the conviction that―in Foucault’s words―‚the history of knowledge can be written 
only on the basis of what was contemporaneous with it.‛7  One should just mention, on this 
point, Ian Hacking’s ‚historical ontology,‛ which explicitly refers to Foucault’s archaeology in 
order to outline his own program of studying ‚the ways in which the styles of reasoning 
                                                          
2 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by Frederik Lawrence (Cambridge: Po-
lity Press, 1987), 248. 
3 Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project, translated by Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
[1998] 2002). 
4 Johanna Oksala, Foucault on Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5 Giorgio Agamben, Signatura rerum (The Signature of All Things): On Method, translated by Luca D’Isanto & 
Kevin Attel (New York: Zone Books, 2009). 
6 Cf. Gary Gutting, ‛Continental Philosophy and the History of Science,‛ in R. C. Olby et. al., Companion to the 
History of Modern Science (London and New York, 1990), 127-147.  See also Jean-François Braunstein, L’His-
toire des sciences: Méthodes, styles et controverses (Paris: Vrin, 2008), and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, On Histo-
ricizing Epistemology, translated by David Fernbach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
7 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), 207. 
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provide stable knowledges and become not the uncovers of objective truth but rather the 
standards of objectivity.‛8 And it is worth remarking that for Hacking too―like in the case of 
Foucault’s episteme―the styles of reasoning are ‚self-autenticating,‛ and far from being a vi-
cious circle, such ‚circularity‛ of each style is ‚to be welcomed,‛ since it just accounts for the 
fact that rationality is always contemporaneous with the sciences and knowledges that em-
body it.9 
Hence, the problems and the questions brought up by the first interpreters of Fou-
cault’s archaeology presented in these ‛regards critiques,‛ their bewilderment before this ‚de-
scription which is neither a history of ideas nor an epistemology of the knowledge’s paths to-
wards an increasing rationality‛ (Amiot) (96) still make sense for the philosopher who knows, 
as Deleuze pointed out in 1966, that knowledge and its conditions cannot be but ‚syn-
chronic.‛ (70)  In the light of the ongoing epistemological debate in which it is involved, Les 
mots et les choses, this ‚great sight, which tries to lead us beyond our faculties of thinking‛ 
(Bourgelin), (245) this ‚capital and uncertain work‛ (De Certeau), (198) thus appears to escape 
from the criticisms of impudence (Amiot), (93) blindness (Revault d’Allonnes), (154) arbitra-
riness (D’Ormesson), (214) abstraction and doctrinaireness (Garaudi), (277) that it had attrac-
ted during the 1960s.  And, far from running into arbitrary relativism, the paradoxical contem-
poraneousness of the philosopher with the knowledge he belongs to, and of which he writes 
the history, seems instead to invoke the ‚modesty‛10 of a history that in Bachelard’s words 
ought ‚ceaselessly to be thought and ceaselessly to be started again.‛11 
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8 Ian Hacking, ‚‘Style’ for Historians and Philosophers,‛ in Historical Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 198. 
9 Ibid.,192. 
10 Hacking, Historical Ontology, 197. 
11 Gaston Bachelard, ‛L’actualité de l’histoire des sciences‛ [1951], in L’Engagement rationaliste (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1972), 146. 
